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Alex Weisiger’s Logics of War observes that most wars last a few months and kill
thousands while a few others last years and kill hundreds of thousands or even millions. Weisiger
then, in a well written and well organized text, offers an explanation of why this is so: short wars
are usually driven by mutual optimism or domestic politics while long wars are caused by
commitment problems. Suggesting that commitment problems are a root cause of long, severe
wars is not new (Powell 2006; 2012; Reiter 2009). Weisiger, however, expands on existing
rationalist arguments about war termination by sorting out the effects of commitment problems
caused by power shifts from those caused by a leader’s perceived aggressive disposition. He also
provides compelling quantitative evidence—something lacking in previous research on
commitment problems. Finally, the work’s theory is ably illustrated in cases on World War Two
and the Paraguayan War as well as in shorter cases on the Crimean, Pacific, Iran-Iraq, Falklands,
Franco-Turkish, and Anglo-Persian Wars.
The book’s argument begins with the insight that in order for a war to end, the causes of
that war must be removed (Blainey, 1988). Like Reiter (2009), Weisiger contends that private
information held antebellum is revealed swiftly by battles provided the war is intensely fought.
This means mutual optimism cannot cause long, intense conflicts as states’ expectations
converge quickly as battles are fought. Weisiger concedes that wars in which there is little
combat in any given period—for example guerilla conflicts—reveal information slowly and thus
can drag on much longer without expectations converging. Still, most informational wars should

be short, meaning long, severe wars cannot rationally be explained by mutual optimism.
Additionally, Weisiger argues regimes waging diversionary wars can only delude their publics
for so long, meaning lengthy wars which are fought for rational reasons must be the result of
commitment problems.
The book proceeds to neatly sort out the implications of two distinct types of
commitment problems: preventive wars fought over concerns about future power shifts and wars
fought because one of the belligerent states is dispositionally unable to credibly commit to peace.
Weisiger argues that wars fought over power shifts are likely to be long and severe as a state’s
ability to demand future concessions after becoming more powerful can only be eliminated by
greatly weakening that state now or significantly reducing its potential for growth. Obviously,
this is difficult to do quickly and requires a great amount of devastation. Alternatively, such wars
could end if the rising power is able to impose the feared future concessions on its opponent in
the present, obviating the need for future conflict. Again, this is likely to take time. Dispositional
commitment problems, however, should lead to even more severe and drawn out conflicts as
introducing regime change as a non-negotiable war aim forces a fight to the finish. Importantly,
the work also explains where such dispositional commitment problems come from. They arise
when the target of a preventive war had no intention of using the coming power shift in the
manner which the aggressor feared. This in turn induces the target to conceive of its opponent as
irrevocably aggressive as it cannot fathom its opponent’s true motives.
Another major contribution is the use of statistics to test the above arguments. Previous
commitment problem research avoided large-n studies in part because no direct, quantifiable
measure of commitment problems exists. Weisiger overcomes this by using shifts in relative
material capabilities during the antebellum period as a proxy for fear of decline and hence

commitment problems. He also uses battle deaths in relation to states’ populations and
capabilities as a proxy for war severity and revealed information. Employing a series of
competing risks regressions he finds that antebellum power shifts do indeed lead to longer wars,
while intense fighting leads to shorter wars. Additional regressions indicate the finding on
intensity is not driven by military collapse. Thus, it is the information revealed by combat which
leads to converging expectations and settlement and not total defeat which leads quicker war
termination. The statistics include a series of robustness checks on model forms and include
controls for military strategy, regime type, relative capabilities, terrain, and population. When
combined the statistics, robust case studies, and careful theorizing make a convincing case for
the importance of commitment problems in explaining war duration and severity.
The book, however, is not without some weaknesses. First, while the book reasonably
argues—and defends with evidence from the Falklands and Franco-Turkish Wars—that intense
wars fought against the will of a state’s selectorate will be relatively short as it becomes
impossible over time for the regime to hide mounting costs and battlefield failures from its own
people, it is less clear why a regime with a small selectorate could not continue a war which
produced private goods for a majority of the selectorate even while harming the broader society.
In other words, while convincing that intense wars fought for private gains or diversionary
purposes will be short given a reasonably large selectorate, it is unclear that there are not some
situations where the selectorate is small enough that a winning coalition could be bought off with
private goods. In such cases, it should be possible to wage long, intense wars that do not benefit
the broader populace. Of course, such scenarios are probably rare meaning the book is right that
there are few long wars driven by domestic politics mechanisms.

Second, the book has some difficulty explaining the end of the Iran-Iraq War. While the
book convincingly argues that dispositional commitment problems posed by Saddam Hussein
were responsible for the Iran-Iraq War being as lengthy and severe as it was, the war ultimately
ended in a negotiated settlement without Saddam being removed from power. While Weisiger
reasonably contends the Iranians concluded the additional fighting required to remove Saddam
would be too costly, why it took them so long to realize this is unclear. Also, this explanation
means commitment problems provide limited leverage in explaining the war’s termination. How
common such negotiated endings are in wars driven by commitment problems is unknown and
the puzzle presented by it raises important questions for future research. It does not, however,
take away from the book’s overall contribution to the war duration and rationalist literatures nor
weaken the argument that commitment problems are causal of long, severe wars.
In sum, the work is a compelling explanation of war severity and especially in relation to
war duration. It is characterized by clear argumentation and provides ample quantitative and
qualitative evidence. It will be of interest to students of war generally and specifically to those
interested in rationalist explanations or in the linkages between war initiation and termination.
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